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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 09-4339 
_____________ 
 
MINNOR ELIGIO PICON-ARAGON,  
                             Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                               Respondent 
_____________ 
 
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE  
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
Agency No. A094-930-247 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Margaret R. Reichenberg 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 13, 2011 
____________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 15, 2011 ) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
Minnor Eligio Picon-Aragon, a native of Guatemala, challenges the denial by the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) of his motion to reopen and remand his asylum 
 2 
proceedings.
1
  At issue is whether he failed to demonstrate past, or a well-founded fear of 
future, persecution on account of membership in a particular social group – to wit, being a 
particularly vulnerable target of Guatemalan gangs, or “maras,” because of his age, 
wealth, and where he lived.  We will deny his petition for review. 
I.  Background 
 Picon-Aragon, now in his early twenties, entered the United States without 
inspection in April 2007, having fled Guatemala because of problems that he attributed to 
the maras.  Specifically, in San Geronimo in 2006, he was robbed after leaving a bank, 
and the home that he shared with his aunt was burglarized.  In early 2007, while returning 
to his own apartment in Guatemala City, gang members assaulted him and told him that 
because they controlled the neighborhood, he would have to pay them to live there.  
Picon-Aragon believed that the Guatemala City assailants were gang members, based on 
slogans that they shouted, hand signs that they flashed, and particular tattoos that they 
                                                 
1
 Picon-Aragon‟s counseled brief asserts that he petitions for review of a March 2009 
BIA decision affirming the Immigration Judge‟s (IJ) denial of his asylum application.  
The government asserts that because, subsequent to that decision, he filed a motion to 
reopen and remand his proceedings, the instant petition in fact seeks review of the BIA‟s 
October 2009 denial of that motion.  See Administrative Record (AR) at 3, 6-11.  
Jurisdiction in this case turns on whether the instant petition is construed as appropriately 
seeking review of the BIA‟s March 2009 dismissal, on the merits, of Picon-Aragon‟s 
appeal of the IJ‟s order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b), or as challenging the BIA‟s 
denial of his subsequent motion to reopen and remand his proceedings, id. § 1003.2(c).  
Given that his putative petition for review of the BIA‟s March 2009 decision appears only 
in the Appendix submitted by his counsel, not in this Court‟s case management / 
electronic case filing system, and that counsel has not filed a Reply Brief challenging the 
government‟s assertion that no such direct petition for review was filed, we will treat the 
instant petition as challenging only the BIA‟s denial of his motion to reopen and remand. 
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sported.  He knew nothing about the identities of the San Geronimo assailants. 
 On these facts, in October 2007 Picon-Aragon filed an application for asylum on 
the premise that he is vulnerable to harm if returned to Guatemala due to his membership 
in the “particular social group” of young, wealthy men in their late teens or early twenties 
who are targeted by the maras for extortion.  The IJ denied his petition for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture in May 2008, and the BIA dismissed his subsequent appeal in March 2009.  Most 
pertinent to the instant petition, both the IJ and the BIA concluded, among other things, 
that Picon-Aragon‟s asserted basis for relief was non-cognizable because the particular 
social group that he has identified as the basis for his persecution is overly broad and does 
not turn on an immutable characteristic. 
II.  Discussion 
 This Court exercises jurisdiction over all final orders of removal pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a).  We apply a standard of review that “is highly deferential: we review 
the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion[, such that d]iscretionary 
decisions of the Board will not be disturbed unless they are found to be arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.” Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  “As a general rule, motions to reopen are granted 
only under compelling circumstances.”  Id. at 561. 
The instant petition principally argues that the IJ and the BIA applied the wrong 
 4 
evidentiary standard in evaluating Picon-Aragon‟s claims, and that the BIA applied the 
wrong legal standard vis-à-vis the necessary predicate for asylum of proving membership 
in a particular social group that is cause for persecution, contending: (1) that Guatemala‟s 
government acts in concert with the maras; and/or (2) that it is incapable of protecting, or 
is unwilling to protect, citizens against them; and/or (3) that the maras “function as [a] 
societal framework” and “a political force to be reckoned with,” such as to constitute, not 
a mere “criminal element,” but a “criminal sovereignty.”  Petitioner‟s Br. at 9.  These are 
essentially the same arguments that Picon-Aragon made to the IJ, as well as to the BIA – 
a point that the BIA noted when it denied his motion to reopen and remand, together with 
the fact he did not allege any additional, new facts, as he was required to do.  See AR at 3 
(citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) & (c)(1) (providing that motions for reconsideration must 
identify specific errors of fact or law in the challenged decision and be supported by 
pertinent authority, and that motions to reopen must present material evidence that was 
unavailable and that could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing)). 
Picon-Aragon‟s instant petition is, likewise, without merit.  The BIA properly 
concluded that his motion to reopen and remand did not advert to previously unavailable 
evidence, identify errors of fact or law other than in conclusory terms, or cite pertinent 
authority.  See id.  Indeed, his brief before this Court does not even address the BIA‟s 
denial of that motion, much less challenge that denial as an abuse of discretion.  As such, 
he effectively has waived any basis for relief here – the availability of relief here itself 
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being dubious, at best.
2
  See United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(arguments in an opening brief that do not cite appropriate authority or relevant parts of 
the record thereby fail to properly raise an appellate issue, thus constituting waiver). 
III.  Conclusion 
For these reasons, and because the remainder of Picon-Aragon‟s arguments are 
without merit, we will deny the petition for review.   
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 Even if we construed the instant petition as properly challenging the BIA‟s dismissal 
of Picon-Aragon‟s appeal of the IJ‟s decision on the merits, it still would fail.  Picon-
Aragon appears to have been the victim of randomized (albeit deplorable) street thug 
robbery.  He has not shown, however, that he is “„unable or unwilling‟ to return to 
[Guatemala] „because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 
… membership in a particular social group,‟” Vente v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 296, 300 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)), which the BIA has defined as meaning a 
group “defined by a common, immutable characteristic that the group members „either 
cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their 
individual identities or consciences.‟”  Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 502 F.3d 285, 
291 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993)).  Here, it 
was proper to conclude that Picon-Aragon‟s claimed basis for relief is too broad and 
malleable – i.e., that he is targeted for extortion by local maras because he is a young, 
wealthy man.  Neither youth, wealth, nor place of residence are immutable characteristics. 
